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The Treaty 8 First Nations and 
BC Hydro's Site C Dam
The struggle between the Treaty 
8 First Nations over the future of their 
land and the Peace River Valley is em-
blematic of broader struggles for self-
determination, recognition of Aborigi-
nal rights and title, and environmental 
justice in Canada. In what follows, I 
attempt to unpack some of the conten-
tious issues surrounding Site C and draw 
attention to the First Nations strategies 
for resistance. By examining the Treaty 
8 First Nations challenge to BC Hydro’s 
Site C dam through an environmen-
tal justice lens, I argue that the project 
represents an inequitable distribution 
of environmental costs and benefits 
between the Province and the affected 
First Nations communities, and under-
mines the right of First Nations peoples 
to maintain and strengthen their own 
institutions, cultures, and traditions, 
and pursue development in keeping 
with their own needs and aspirations as 
outlined in the United Nations Declara-
tion of Indigenous Peoples (art. 20).
I will begin by providing a brief 
background of the history of Site C, 
including an overview of previous de-
velopment on the Peace River, a sum-
mary of the project’s key components 
and their anticipated environmental 
impacts, and the rationale for build-
ing the dam. In the next section, I dis-
cuss the First Nations perspective of 
the project—as well as any differences 
of opinion amongst the Treaty 8 First 
Nations—and their experience of con-
sultation, dispute settlement, and their 
subsequent legal challenge. Lastly, I 
attempt to draw parallels with previ-
ous First Nations court decisions and 
discuss the potential for the case to set 
a legal precedent regarding how Cana-
dian courts balance issues of resource 
development, public interest, and First 
Nations land claims.
Finally, it is necessary to disclose 
that as this is an ongoing story the dis-
cussion included herein is by no means 
exhaustive nor are the positions of 
prominent actors in any sense fixed. It 
is also necessary to acknowledge that 
while this study employs environmen-
tal justice as a foundation for analysis, it 
represents only one of many ways to ap-
proach and explore the subject of First 
Nations rights and self-determination 
in Canada. Similarly, as a means of de-
lineating this study, I focus specifically 
on the stories of Aboriginal communi-
ties and their opposition to Site C; while 
the proposed hydroelectric project 
would have extensive effects on a range 
of groups beyond Aboriginal peoples, 
these impacts are beyond the scope of 
this paper.
History of Site C
The W.A.C. Bennett Dam at the 
head of the Peace River Canyon was the 
first hydroelectric facility built on the 
Peace waterway. Completed in 1967, the 
dam is one of the world’s largest earth-
fill dams,2 and impounds BC’s largest 
The Site C Clean Energy Project is a proposed dam and hydroelectric generating 
station on the Peace River in northeast British Columbia, seven kilometres southwest 
of the city of Fort St. John. The proposed site—within the Peace River Valley—is home 
to BC’s Treaty 8 First Nations with an approximate Aboriginal1 population of 2500-
3000 people (T8TA, "Treat 8 Communities"). The project’s proponent, BC Hydro, 
received environmental approval for Site C from the federal and provincial govern-
ments on October 14, 2014 (BCEAO Conditional Environmental Assessment Certificate 
Granted: Site C Clean Energy Project; CEAA "Government of Canada's Decision on the 
Environmental Assessment of the Site C Clean Energy Project"); however, the proj-
ect still requires an investment decision from the Province and regulatory permits 
and authorizations before it can proceed to construction (BC Hydro, "Multi-Stage 
Evaluation"). The Treaty 8 First Nations are opposing Site C, having filed a lawsuit on 
grounds that the project would have a devastating impact on their traditional land and 
thus violate their treaty rights (Keller).
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reservoir, Williston Lake (BC Hydro, 
"W.A.C. Bennett Dam"). Williston Lake, 
which in reality is an artificial reservoir, 
formed when the W.A.C. Bennett Dam 
caused parts of three rivers—the Fin-
lay, Parsnip, and the Peace—to flood; 
its creation destroyed habitat, changed 
the immediate climate of the area, and 
compromised biodiversity (Loo 901). In 
addition to flooding 140,000 hectares 
of forested land and blocking the east-
west migration of the now endangered 
mountain caribou across the Rocky 
Mountain Trench, the creation of Wil-
liston Lake also affected some 40 or 50 
members of the Tsay Keh Dene First Na-
tion; the Sekani peoples, then known as 
the Ingenika, were relocated to new re-
serves when it became clear their settle-
ments and traplines near Fort Grahame 
and Finlay Forks would be inundated by 
the reservoir’s waters (Loo 901).
The Peace Canyon Dam was con-
structed thirteen years later and twen-
ty-three kilometres downstream from 
the W.A.C. Bennett Dam at the outlet 
of the Peace River Canyon (BC Hydro, 
"W.A.C. Bennett Dam"). Before con-
struction of the Peace Canyon Dam was 
completed, the search for an appropri-
ate site for a third dam had already be-
gun. Following exploratory surveys, the 
government identified five potential 
sites—Sites A, B, C, D, and E—between 
the Peace Canyon Dam and the Alberta 
border as suitable for generating sta-
tions (BC Hydro, Peace River Site C hydro 
project: An option to help close B.C.'s 
growing electricity gap 22). In 1967, geo-
logical reconnaissance determined that 
Sites B and D were unattractive due to 
unstable geology, while Site A would re-
quire the removal of significantly more 
overburden, leaving Site C and E as the 
only viable options (22).
After a 1976 feasibility study, sur-
veyors deemed Site C the topographi-
cally and geologically preferable loca-
tion for another earthfill dam. However, 
whereas the W.A.C. Bennett and Peace 
Canyon Dams were uncontroversial at 
the time of their construction and were 
planned and built with little to no public 
debate, growing awareness of the envi-
ronmental impacts of hydroelectricity 
and new expectations regarding pub-
lic input into decision-making created 
concern about the BC energy planning 
regime (Dusyk 875). Therefore, in 1981, 
the provincial government referred BC 
Hydro’s application for an Energy Proj-
ect Certificate for Site C to the newly 
created British Columbia Utilities Com-
mission (BCUC) for review. Following 
a two-year assessment of the project’s 
justification, design, impacts, and other 
relevant matters, the BCUC released its 
report in 1983 concluding that:
An Energy Project Certificate for 
Site C should not be issued at this 
time. The evidence does not dem-
onstrate that construction must or 
should start immediately or that Site 
C is the only or best feasible source 
of supply to follow Revelstoke in 
the system plan. The Commission 
therefore concludes that an Energy 
Project Certificate for Site C should 
not be issued until (1) an acceptable 
forecast demonstrates that construc-
tion must begin immediately in order 
to avoid supply deficiencies and (2) 
a comparison of alternative feasible 
system plans demonstrates, from 
a social benefit-cost point of view, 
that Site C is the best project to meet 
the anticipated supply deficiency. 
(BCUC 10-11)
With respect to the impacts on 
First Nations communities, the BCUC 
found that “while the impacts of Site 
C on a provincial scale may be small, 
they could be significant to the native 
population in the region” (BCUC 19). 
The BCUC also suggested that impacts 
on First Nations communities be moni-
tored and that if, for instance, adverse 
impacts on hunting were identified, 
“then measures to compensate in kind 
be implemented; monetary compensa-
tion will not suffice [emphasis added]” 
(BCUC 19).
In the wake of BCUC’s denial of 
the application, BC Hydro revisited 
the prospect of proceeding with Site 
C throughout the 1980s until they de-
cided to suspend engineering and other 
work in March 1991 as opportunities for 
demand-side management and gas-fired 
generation became more attractive ways 
of meeting demand (BC Hydro 23). It 
was not until 2004 under the Province’s 
Integrated Electricity Plan (IEP) that BC 
Hydro tabled Site C again as a potential 
energy development option (BC Hydro, 
Integrated Electricity Plan: Summary 29).
The proposed Site C earthfill dam 
would measure just over a kilometre 
in length and rise 60 meters above the 
riverbed with a rated capacity of 1,100 
megawatts, producing 5,100 gigawatt 
hours of electricity annually. The Site C 
reservoir would run for 83 kilometres, 
flooding 5,500 hectares of land, and 
double to triple the width of the current 
river (BC Hydro, Environmental Impact 
Statement: Executive Summary 10). The 
estimated capital cost of the project in-
cluding construction and development 
costs, inflation, contingencies, and in-
terest accrued over the course of the 
seven-year period needed to complete 
construction would be $7.9 billion (BC 
Hydro, "Cost Estimate").
The revival of the Site C proposal 
began with an outline of a five-stage 
approach, beginning with a feasibility 
review, followed by a consultation and 
technical review, an environmental 
and regulatory review, acquisition of 
permits and regulatory approvals, and 
finally construction. The feasibility re-
view took place between 2004 and 2007, 
in which BC Hydro declared: (1) that 
the anticipated magnitude of the Prov-
[T]he [British Columbia Utilities Commission] 
found that "while the impacts of Site C on 
a provincial scale may be small, they 
could be significant to the native 
population in the region."
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ince’s electricity gap3 was significant 
enough that Site C should continue to 
be examined as a potential resource op-
tion; (2) that no project characteristics 
were identified that would render Site 
C unfeasible; and (3) that Site C would 
offer sufficient overall benefits relative 
to alternatives to make it an attractive 
electricity option (BC Hydro, Peace 
River Site C hydro project: An option to 
help close B.C.'s growing electricity gap 
iv). Given the above findings, BC Hydro 
encouraged moving the project on to 
Stage 2. 
Following provincial approval of 
Stage 1, consultation took place over 
a period of a year between December 
2007 and December 2008, during which 
time BC Hydro initiated consultation 
and engagement with 41 Aboriginal 
groups consisting primarily of Treaty 8 
First Nations in BC (BC Hydro, Stage 2 
report: Consultation and technical review 
44). The approach and conclusions of 
the consultation and technical review 
differed markedly between BC Hydro 
and the Treaty 8 First Nations. In re-
sponse to First Nations raising griev-
ances related to past BC Hydro projects 
in the area and the cumulative effects of 
past and current projects on the region 
including those from the mining and oil 
and gas sectors,4 BC Hydro submitted 
that consultation would be “ongoing” 
with “a greater focus on impact assess-
ment, mitigation, and accommodation” 
(46) if the government accepted its 
recommendation to move the project 
into the environmental and regulatory 
review phase. In contrast, the Treaty 
8 First Nations’ report claimed that 
BC Hydro had not made best efforts to 
complete the consultation process as 
agreed and documented in the Stage 2 
Consultation Agreement, the purpose 
of which was to include the identifica-
tion of potential impacts, and accom-
modation and mitigation options, prior 
to any decision being made on whether 
the assessment should proceed to Stage 
3. The Treaty 8 Tribal Association as-
serted that, 
There have been excessive delays in 
providing the results of the reports 
and studies to the Treaty 8 First Na-
tions, delays in responding to writ-
ten questions regarding potential 
impacts of the proposed project and 
delays in allowing the commence-
ment of the TLUS [Traditional Land 
Use Study]. Collectively, these delays 
have prevented the Treaty 8 First Na-
tions from fully participating in the 
Stage 2 Consultation Agreement on 
the basis of free, prior and informed 
consent and, accordingly, the only 
conclusion that can be reached is that 
efforts have been inadequate and 
commitments under the Stage 2 Con-
sultation Agreement remain unful-
filled. (T8TA, Treaty 8 First Nations 
report on stage 2 consultation 14-15)
The Treaty 8 Tribal Association, con-
sisting of a council of five of the eight5 
BC Treaty 8 First Nations Chiefs, also 
questioned BC Hydro’s decision to con-
duct Stage 1 without any involvement of 
First Nations and to have made signifi-
cant progress on Stage 2 (including the 
completion of the public pre-consulta-
tion, which outlined how stakeholders 
wished to be consulted and about what 
topics) before engaging with the Treaty 
8 First Nations at all (2). Together, these 
factors led the Treaty 8 First Nations 
to register their strong objection to BC 
Hydro for having made a recommen-
dation to the provincial government to 
proceed to Stage 3.
The provincial government ac-
cepted BC Hydro’s recommendation 
and authorized the Site C proposal to 
move to environmental assessment. 
The review process began in 2011 and 
concluded on October 14, 2014, when 
the Canadian Environmental Assess-
ment Agency (CEAA) and the British 
Columbia Environmental Assessment 
Office (BCEAO) granted approval to 
the proposal (BC Hydro, Environmental 
Impact Statement: Executive Summary 2). 
In addition to shouldering an increased 
burden from generalized environmen-
tal impacts such as soil erosion, loss of 
agricultural land, habitat fragmenta-
tion and alteration, loss of wildlife, and 
reduction in fish health and survival 
(CEAA, Volume 5, Section 39: Complete 
Lists of Mitigation and Follow-up Mea-
sures), First Nations groups also faced 
specific cultural losses due to their im-
mediate and deep-rooted relationship 
with the land. Several burial sites, cer-
emonial areas, medicinal plant harvest-
ing zones, and teaching areas are at risk 
of being irrevocably lost due to flooding 
from the Site C reservoir. Moreover, the 
CEAA admits that these type of dam-
ages are not amenable to mitigation or 
compensation measures.
At the time of writing, BC Hydro 
is awaiting a decision from their Board 
of Directors and the Province to secure 
regulatory permits and funding before 
they can proceed to project construc-
tion. In the following section, I examine 
the project’s impacts and opposition to 
the development of Site C more closely 
through the perspective of First Nations 
communities. I also attempt to differen-
tiate between the perspectives, posi-
tions, and strategies of the Treaty 8 First 
Nations in negotiating compensation, 
engaging in direct action, or litigating.
Uneven Burdens and the First Nations 
Response
 
From its formal emergence in the 
early 1980s in the United States, the en-
vironmental justice movement focused 
on the existence of inequity in the dis-
tribution of environmental “bads.” The 
concept illustrates that not only do 
some communities receive more envi-
ronmental risks than others, but goes 
on to ask why those (typically racial-
ized and/or marginalized) communities 
were devalued in the first place (Schlos-
berg 39). In the Canadian context, part 
Several burial sites, ceremonial areas, 
medicinal plant harvesting zones, and 
teaching areas are at risk of being irrevocably 
lost due to flooding from the Site C reservoir.
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of the answer may lie in the way en-
vironmental justice fits into existing 
policy paradigms. Geographer Michael 
Buzzelli notes that the Canadian identi-
ty and collectivist ethos of fairness and 
social welfare built on a foundation of 
progressive taxation is ill-equipped to 
account for or measure “environmental 
deficits” in the way it does socio-eco-
nomic inequalities between individuals, 
households, neighbourhoods, and com-
munities. The unpriced, spatially un-
even, and often unfair character of en-
vironmental quality is also complicated 
by environmental justice’s emphasis on 
distributive justice over absolute pollu-
tion reduction (Buzzelli 7).
Further resource development 
such as Site C only stands to exacerbate 
environmental stressors in a region 
that is already experiencing enormous 
and widespread changes due to a con-
vergence of industrial interests in the 
area. In their study of the Peace River 
region, the David Suzuki Foundation 
& Global Forest Watch calculated that 
physical changes from logging, mining, 
oil and gas development, water with-
drawals, stream crossings, large-scale 
hydro development, and urban and ag-
ricultural conversions take up one fifth 
of the Peace Region landscape. If this is 
expanded to account for the effects on 
wildlife populations, over two thirds of 
the region would be classified as what 
Dane-zaa elder May Apsassin refers to 
as “broken” country for wildlife and the 
communities that rely on them (2).
In the case of Site C, there is a strong 
case that Aboriginal communities carry 
a disproportionate burden from en-
vironmental risks and that the dam-
ages from these risks are typically of a 
higher magnitude than those facing the 
general population. The report of the 
Joint Review Panel6 on Site C found—in 
disagreement with BC Hydro—that the 
project would have significant adverse 
effects on fishing opportunities and 
practices for the Blueberry River First 
Nations and the First Nations represent-
ed by the Treaty 8 Tribal Association 
(CEAA, Report of the joint review panel: 
Site C clean energy project 314). Site C, 
however, would not significantly af-
fect the harvest of fish and wildlife by 
non-Aboriginal people (iv). Part of the 
reason for this discrepancy is that First 
Nations treaty rights include the right to 
hunt, fish, and trap for preferred species 
such as bull trout, Arctic grayling, and 
mountain whitefish—most of which 
would be lost—while the species that 
stand to benefit have been introduced 
to the ecosystem and are of little inter-
est to them.
Flooding from Site C would alter or 
destroy many of these traditional fish-
ing grounds; thus, knowledge of fishing 
grounds, preferred species, and cultural 
attachment to specific sites would be 
lost. The Site C reservoir would also 
produce changes in hydrology and sedi-
mentation, which would alter the com-
position of fish species through habitat 
loss and disruption of migration routes 
(126). Moreover, the panel raised health 
concerns over increased methylmer-
cury levels in fish and fish-eating wild-
life since it is primarily First Nations 
that depend on them as a food source 
(221). In contrast, the economic stabil-
ity of the sport fishery is not so depen-
dent on numbers of fish harvested as it 
is on “maintenance of opportunity and 
expectation” (131). The Joint Review 
Panel found that no mitigation mea-
sures short of stopping development 
existed to safeguard First Nations fish-
ing opportunities, whereas measures 
to support recreational shoreline use, 
boating access, and water-based naviga-
tion could all serve to buoy fishing op-
portunities and mitigate the effects of 
construction on changes in public fish-
ing areas for non-Aboriginals.
The panel, again in disagreement 
with BC Hydro, also found that the 
project would likely cause significant 
adverse and cumulative effects on hunt-
ing, non-tenured trapping, and tradi-
tional uses of land, all of which predom-
inantly impress upon the livelihoods of 
Aboriginal peoples. The multitude of 
disagreements regarding the environ-
mental impacts of Site C between Ab-
original groups and BC Hydro are tell-
ing of whose voices are privileged and 
how the concerns of various parties are 
weighed. For instance, the rationale for 
Site C rests on the claim that it would 
supply electricity that British Columbi-
ans need and would pay for, at a lower 
combination of price and external costs 
than any other alternative; however, the 
provincial government has refused to 
tender an independent assessment of BC 
Hydro’s projections. The BCUC, which 
typically makes such assessments, has 
been blocked from doing so by the pro-
vincial government, which passed an 
Order-in-Council and a provision in the 
Clean Energy Act that exempted Site C 
from this customary regulatory review 
(Johnston).
The Treaty 8 Tribal Association 
conducted its own analysis of alterna-
tives to Site C and concluded that “the 
superiority of Site C in relation to the al-
ternatives has not been demonstrated” 
and that “Site C is not a cost-effective 
solution to meeting BC Hydro’s forecast 
needs for additional energy and capac-
ity” (Raphals 41). Treaty 8 Tribal Chief 
Liz Logan wrote that “BC Hydro has not 
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its own analysis of alternatives to Site 
C and concluded that "the superiority 
of Site C in relation to the alternatives 
has not been demonstrated" and that 
"Site C is not a cost-effective solution 
to meeting BC Hydro's forecast needs 
for additional energy and capacity."
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taken seriously clean energy alterna-
tives…nor have the concerns of the com-
munities and stakeholders impacted by 
the project been properly assessed.” 
The Canadian Geothermal Energy As-
sociation also objected to BC Hydro’s 
predilection for further damming of 
the Peace, arguing that compared to 
Site C, geothermal could offer more 
jobs spread throughout BC and First Na-
tions, provide electricity at a lower cost 
and with fewer environmental impacts, 
and provide planning flexibility to fol-
low the actual demand growth in the 
provincial system (295).7 Other critics 
insisted that a variety of geographically 
dispersed intermittent clean or renew-
able energy sources such as run-of-river, 
wind, small-scale hydro, or solar would 
be capable of dispatching power more 
reliably and beneficially than fewer and 
less diverse power sources like the pro-
posed hydroelectric megaproject (294).
In this sense, Site C is simply the 
latest project in a long series of resource 
development plans in the Peace region, 
an area already crisscrossed with pipe-
lines, fractured by clearcuts, and strewn 
with petroleum and natural gas well sites 
and facilities. While some Treaty 8 First 
Nations were initially willing to discuss 
mitigation and compensation measures 
with the BC government, this changed 
as more information became available. 
“Now everyone is opposed,”8 said Chief 
Roland Willson of the West Moberly 
First Nation (Lavoie). Blueberry River 
First Nations is one of the communi-
ties that originally agreed to negotiate 
an impact benefit agreement (Pynn), 
but following public hearings and the 
BC government’s approach to evaluat-
ing Site C in isolation from the cumula-
tive impacts of all the other industrial 
activity in the area, the band backed 
away from the talks. Negotiations broke 
down after the band requested that the 
Province set aside 8,100 hectares of 
land from development, to which the 
Province countered with a guarantee 
to protect 2,900 hectares on condition 
that the band give up its claim to treaty 
rights on all the other land in their tra-
ditional territory (Hume).  
Early opposition to Site C amongst 
Aboriginal communities took the form 
of protests such as the Peace River En-
vironmental Association’s “Paddle for 
the Peace” and the Yellowstone to Yu-
kon Conservation Initiative’s “Focus 
on Peace” campaign. Following the 
Joint Review Panel’s judgement that BC 
Hydro “has not fully demonstrated the 
need for the project on the timetable set 
forth” (306), Fort Nelson First Nation 
Chief Liz Logan and West Moberly First 
Nation Chief Roland Willson visited Ot-
tawa with Grand Chief Stewart Phillip, 
head of the Union of BC Indian Chiefs, 
to lobby against Site C in September 
(Stodalka). Nonetheless, a month later 
CEAA and the BCEAO gave Site C envi-
ronmental approval.
In response to the decision, the 
Doig River, Prophet River, West Mober-
ly, and McLeod Lake bands filed a judi-
cial review against Site C, claiming that 
the Ministry of Environment failed to 
consider the effects the dam would have 
on First Nations treaty rights (Stodal-
ka). The judicial review will determine 
whether the Ministry of Environment 
failed to adequately consider the poten-
tial impact of Site C on First Nations, 
thus violating their treaty rights. If the 
Province goes ahead with development 
before the review is over, the First Na-
tions litigants say they will seek an in-
junction to halt construction (Stodal-
ka). The Mikisew Cree and Athabasca 
Chipewyan of Northern Alberta have 
also joined their Treaty 8 counterparts 
in legal action challenging the govern-
ment’s failure to consult them properly 
and consider the downstream effects 
of Site C on the Peace Athabasca Delta 
(CBC News).
Previous Court Descisions and Implica-
tions for Canadian Environmental Law
Former Chief Stewart Cameron of 
the Saulteau First Nations, speaking on 
the significance of Treaty 8 said:
Whether they were written or not, 
we know what the true spirit and in-
tent of Treaty 8 is to us…for hunting, 
fishing, trapping, yes, but it goes way 
more than that also. It’s a way of life, 
mode of life, [a] meaning that’s [in] 
the land. It’s related to the land…Our 
language is related to the land. Our 
teachings come from that. Our way 
of life, our laws come from that, from 
all of this. (125)
Cameron’s statement highlights that 
Aboriginal treaty rights represent more 
than mere permits to hunt and fish. In-
deed, they must be viewed in the con-
text of the fundamental place of land in 
their culture, including rights to occupy 
the land and to secure the continuity of 
traditional knowledge.
The Mikisew Cree First Nation v. 
Canada, 2005 SCC 69, decision provides 
support for Cameron’s claim that the 
words in the Treaty are to be “interpret-
ed in the sense that they would natu-
rally have been understood by the In-
dians at the time of signing” (para. 29). 
In relation to Site C, this means that any 
adverse effects on Treaty 8 First Nations 
must be considered under the scope of 
their traditional territories and “not on 
a treaty-wide basis” (para. 48). The ra-
tionale for Site C therefore remains just 
as tenuous as it was three decades prior 
when the BCUC reported that the losses 
First Nations would incur posed a seri-
Site C is simply the latest project in a 
long series of resource development 
plans in the Peace region, an area already 
crisscrossed with pipelines, fractured by 
clearcuts, and strewn with petroleum 
and natural gas well sites and facilities.
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ous threat to their way of life and “could 
not be compensated for” (BCUC 277).
Anna Johnston of the West Coast 
Environmental Law Association argues 
that the significant environmental and 
social costs that would be borne by the 
residents of BC’s Peace region could 
only be justified by an unambiguous 
need for Site C’s power, something BC 
Hydro has not satisfactorily demon-
strated according to the Joint Review 
Panel. Thus, 
The test for whether BC Hydro 
should be allowed to build with Site 
C, then, is an “unambiguous need” 
for the energy it would provide. 
Without conclusive proof that BC 
will need Site C by the time it would 
start operating, the dam’s approval 
cannot be justified. (Johnston)
As the proposal for Site C stands at the 
time of writing, going forward with the 
project would undermine not only the 
role of meaningful consultation and ac-
commodation but also the premise of 
Aboriginal title more broadly. 
With respect to Aboriginal title, 
the recent Supreme Court judgement 
in Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Colum-
bia, 2014 SCC 44, can prove instruc-
tive. The Court found that Aboriginal 
title confers ownership rights includ-
ing, “the right to decide how the land 
will be used; the right of enjoyment and 
occupancy of the land; the right to pos-
sess the land; the right to the economic 
benefits of the land; and the right to 
pro-actively use and manage the land” 
(para. 73). Furthermore, “incursions on 
Aboriginal title cannot be justified if 
they would substantially deprive future 
generations of the benefit of the land” 
(para. 86). BC Hydro’s Site C proposal 
is not justified on the basis of a compel-
ling and substantial public interest con-
sidering, (1) that BC Hydro has not fully 
demonstrated the need for the project 
on the timetable set forth (CEAA, Re-
port of the joint review panel: Site C clean 
energy project 306); and (2) that alterna-
tive resources could provide adequate 
energy and capacity until at least 2028 
(299, 304).
The Delgamuukw v. British Co-
lumbia, 1997 SCC 1010, decision also 
affirms the content of Aboriginal title 
described in the Tsilhqot’in Nation case. 
Here, judges arrived at the conclusion 
that Aboriginal title encompasses “the 
right to exclusive use and occupation of 
the land held pursuant to that title for 
a variety of purposes” (para. 117). Ac-
cordingly, justification for infringement 
upon Aboriginal title must be consistent 
with the special fiduciary relationship 
between the Crown and the Aboriginal 
peoples (para. 162). This suggests that 
the Crown has a duty to involve Aborig-
inal peoples in decisions taken with re-
spect to their lands, which in most cases 
will be significantly deeper than mere 
consultation.
Considering the outcry from First 
Nations communities has centred on the 
government’s disregard for the conclu-
sions of the Joint Review Panel, there is 
good reason to believe that BC Hydro’s 
Site C proposal has taken consultation 
for a mere formality on the way to do-
ing what they intended all along. This is 
also evidenced in the tension between 
First Nations requests to complete a 
comprehensive cumulative assessment 
and allow for their formal participation 
in the decision-making process before 
moving forward with the development 
of Site C (T8TA, "First Nations decla-
ration concerning the proposed Site C 
dam") and BC Hydro’s insistence that 
further consultation and accommoda-
tion would be forthcoming contingent 
on approval to move Site C along the de-
velopment process (BC Hydro 6).    
With the threat of permanent de-
struction for swathes of Aboriginal 
territory in the Peace River watershed, 
compensation in-kind for the construc-
tion of Site C is not possible. The panel 
report made clear that there would be 
significant adverse effects on fish and 
fish habitat, rare plants, wetlands, wild-
life habitat, traditional uses of land by 
First Nations, and on cultural heritage 
resources for both Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal people (CEAA, Report of 
the joint review panel: Site C clean energy 
project iv). Bearing in mind these effects 
in the context of permanently flooding 
5,500 hectares of land across an 83 kilo-
metre stretch of the Peace River and its 
tributaries makes any justification for 
Site C fly in the face of deference for fu-
ture generations. At best, Site C should 
be a last resort, one that should be vis-
ited only after pause for thought is given 
to examine whether better policies may 
lead to better alternatives.
Site C’s implications for Canadian 
environmental law and justice include 
questions over how public goods are 
squared with treaty rights, and the de-
gree of jurisdiction governments hold 
over aboriginal lands. Another con-
tentious issue is around the notion of 
“veto.” BC Environment Minister Mary 
Polak has upheld that the government’s 
obligation “is meaningful consultation 
[and] accommodation where it is ap-
propriate—we don’t believe that consti-
tutionally there exists such a thing as a 
veto” (Stueck). However, what of cases 
such as Site C, in which accommodation 
cannot begin to offset the social and 
cultural losses incurred by Aboriginal 
peoples. In this sense, we are preserv-
ing a myth that “meaningful consulta-
tion” amounts to nothing more than a 
process—a series of boxes to check off. 
Meaningful consultation must allow 
for room to say “no.” Likewise, it is en-
tirely fanciful to think that no damage 
exists which cannot be compensated or 
somehow accommodated. At play is a 
fundamental clash of values, an incom-
mensurability between price and dig-
nity, making a living and making a life. 
While many of these questions remain 
[T]here would be significant adverse effects 
on fish and fish habitat, rare plants, wetlands, 
wildlife habitat, traditional uses of land by First 
Nations, and on cultural heritage resources for 
both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people.
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to be hashed out in courts, Canada’s Ab-
original peoples continue to make clear 
that putting a price on nature, on one’s 
livelihood and cultural heritage, dimin-
ishes not just one peoples but us all.
Addendum
On July 7th, 2015, the BC govern-
ment issued two dozen permits to BC 
Hydro granting them rights to timber 
removal, road construction, and site 
preparation, which constitute the first 
phase of construction of the Site C dam. 
In response, the West Moberly and 
Prophet River First Nations filed an ap-
plication for injunctive relief to enjoin 
BC Hydro from undertaking any work 
pursuant to the permits until their pe-
tition was heard and determined. How-
ever, in August, Justice Sewell ruled 
against their claim writing that he was 
satisfied “that the petitioners were 
provided a meaningful opportunity to 
participate in the environmental assess-
ment process,” and that the process as a 
whole did provide the petitioners with 
“a reasoned explanation as to why their 
position, that the project should not pro-
ceed at all, was not accepted” (Hume). 
He also found that the government had 
“made reasonable and good faith efforts 
to consult and accommodate” First Na-
tions.
Construction of a work camp ex-
pected to house 1,800 workers when it 
opens early next year is currently un-
derway and BC Hydro has awarded a 
$1.5 billion contract to the Peace River 
Hydro Consortium9 as its preferred 
partner in the project (CBC News). For 
now, a coalition of First Nations groups 
led by President of the Union of BC In-
dian Chiefs Stewart Phillip is urging the 
new federal government to take action 
to stop Site C. Grand Chief Phillip not-
ed that while their legal challenge was 
rejected in Federal Court this summer, 
the West Moberly and Prophet River 
First Nations will ask the Trudeau gov-
ernment to drop federal government 
opposition to an appeal of that decision.
Notes
1  It is necessary to differentiate between the 
usage of “Aboriginal” and “First Nations” 
in this paper. I use Aboriginal as an all-en-
compassing term that includes Inuit, First 
Nations, and Métis, whereas “First Nations” 
refers to Aboriginal peoples who are neither 
Inuit nor Métis.
2  An earthfill dam, also referred to as an em-
bankment dam, consists of numerous layers 
of compacted earth that form an impervious 
barrier across a waterway and impound a 
reservoir behind it.
3 The electricity gap was calculated based 
off the 2007 BC Energy Plan’s (BC MEM) 
objective of achieving energy self-sufficien-
cy by 2016 as well as having an additional 
3,000 gigawatt hours of capacity by 2026. 
BC Hydro’s forecasted data show customer 
demand at approximately 75,000 gigawatt 
hours with a supply of only 55,000 gigawatt 
hours in 2026 (BC Hydro 2).
4 For more details on industrial interests in 
the Peace Region, refer to the David Suzuki 
Foundation’s report Passages from the Peace 
(2013).
5 The five First Nations represented by the 
Treaty 8 Tribal Association are Doig River, 
Halfway River, Prophet River, Saulteau, and 
West Moberly First Nations (T8TA). Blue-
berry River, McLeod Lake, and Fort Nelson 
First Nations make up the other three Treaty 
8 First Nations in BC.
6 The federal and provincial governments 
appointed the Joint Review Panel, which was 
chaired by individuals with academic and 
professional backgrounds. While the voices 
of First Nations peoples were prominent at 
the public hearings, they had no representa-
tion on the panel.
7 BC has however put policy constraints on 
the development of geothermal so that only 
independent power producers may develop 
it; as a result, BC Hydro has invested little in 
geothermal exploration, research, and engi-
neering (CEAA 308).
8 Refer to signatories of the First Nations Dec-
laration Concerning the Proposed Site C Dam 
(2010).
9 The consortium is comprised of Acciona 
Infrastructure Canada, Samsung C&T Cana-
da, and the Petrowest Corporation. 
At play is a fundamental clash of values, 
an incommensurability between price and 
dignity, making a living and making a life.
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